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Complementarity in Public Health Systems: Using
Redundancy as a Tool of Public Health Governance
Lance Gable* & Benjamin Mason Meier**
I. INTRODUCTION
Modem notions of public health law embody an astounding complexity.
Layers of authority arise from the accretion of legislative, regulatory, and
common law developments over many years and across many subjects and
jurisdictions.' As recognition of the variety and interconnectedness of public
health threats has grown to encompass both proximal and distal determinants
of health, the application and relevance of law has evolved to address these
challenges. 2 Traditional understandings of public health law focused
primarily on alleviation of infectious diseases, promotion of sanitation, and
the constitutional powers authorizing these activities;3 however, the current
scope of public health law recognizes an expanded role of law to establish
and support health infrastructure, regulate activities and behaviors that may
threaten health, and grapple with disease prevention and health promotion
across populations and jurisdictions.' Accordingly, public health systemsand the laws that enable and govern them-have evolved over time to include
a wide array of participants governed by disparate legal regimes.
As with all complex systems of governance, many aspects of public health
governance overlap or contain duplicative features. Public health problems
transcend political, geographical, and jurisdictional borders. Consequently,
public health governance cannot be neatly compartmentalized into discrete
efforts and activities.' Moreover, the changing risks created by evolving
Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University.
Assistant Professor of Global Health Policy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
The authors would like to thank Lisa Todd for her outstanding research assistance on this
article.
1. See generally LAWRENCE 0. GoSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT
(2nd ed. 2008); WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW (2009).
2. See generally DOROTHY PORTER, HEALTH, CIVILIZATION AND THE STATE: A HISTORY OF
PUBLIC HEALTH FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES (1999).

3. Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and the Role of the
State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 278-285(1993).
4. See PARMET, supra note 1; GoSTIN, supra note 1.
5. See David P. Fidler, Return of the Fourth Horseman: Emerging Infectious Diseases
and International Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 771, 774 (1997) (noting that "microbes do not
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public health threats frequently demand a multi-actor response to increase the
likelihood of success for public health strategies. 6 Yet the presence of such
redundancy, within and across public health systems, has often generated
criticism from researchers and practitioners. Critics view redundancy as
wasteful, inefficient, or indicative of conflicting authorities. Much of the
legal and policy debate on reforms to public health law and governance
adopts a negative view of redundancy as inherently harmful to good
governance, a lamentable feature of antiquated legal systems or an
impediment to efficient service provision.7 Efforts to impose greater
hierarchy within and across public health systems,8 to clearly delineate and
differentiate jurisdictional powers, 9 or to use preemption to impose consistent
rules on regulated industries 0 share the common goal to "reform" public
health law to reduce aspects of redundancy.
However, redundancy should not be reflexively discounted in public
health governance, as overlapping systems serve many beneficial functions
in public health law. The problematic features of redundant systems and
institutions-inconsistency in norms and processes, uncertainty driven by
overlapping authority, and inefficiency of cost and effort-can be mitigated
through strategies that allow for complementarity.
Complementarity
renames and reframes the concept of redundancy. Complementarity involves
recognize borders"); Lawrence 0. Gostin, Meeting Basic Survival Needs of the World's Least
Healthy People: Toward a Framework Convention on Global Health, 96 GEO. L.J. 331, 350352 (2008) (noting the global spread of non-communicable diseases).
6. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Mgmt. Agency,
Emergency Support Function #8-Public Health and Medical Services Annex, available at
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-esf-08.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2013); World
Health Org., Global Monitoring Framework and Strategy for the Global Plan Towards the
Elimination of New HIV Infections Among Children by 2015 and Keeping Their Mothers Alive
(EMTCT) (April 2012), available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/75341/1/
9789241504270_eng.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2013).
7. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Glen Safford & Deborah Erickson, Using the Turning Point
Model State Public Health Law, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 88 (2003); James G. Hodge, Jr.,
Lawrence 0. Gostin, Kristine Gebbie & Deborah L. Erickson, Transforming Public Health
Law: The Turning Point Model State Public Health Act, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 77 (2006).
8. See, e.g., James Balcius & Bryan A. Liang, Public Health Law & Military Medical
Assets: Legal Issues in Federalizing National Guard Personnel, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 35
(2009); David L. Feinberg, Hurricane Katrina and the Public Health-Based Argument for
Greater Federal Involvement in Disaster Preparedness and Response, 13 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y
& L. 596 (2006); James G. Hodge, Jr. & Evan D. Anderson, Principles and Practice of Legal
Triage During Public Health Emergencies, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 249 (2008);
Kumanan Wilson et. al., Establishing Public Health Security in APostwar Iraq: Constitutional
Obstacles and Lessons for Other Federalizing States, 34 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 381
(2009).
9. Deborah L. Erickson et al., The Power to Act: Two Model State Statutes, 30 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 57 (2002); Hodge, Gostin, Gebbie & Erickson, supra note 7.
10. William W. Buzbee, Asymetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor
/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1547 (2007).

Vol 22, 2013

Annals of Health Law

226

COMPLEMENTARITY IN PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEMS

establishing and utilizing overlapping and duplicative systems to achieve
beneficial policy outcomes. Thus, complementarity within overlapping and
duplicative networks of governance:
*
*
*
*

Creates opportunities to expand capacity, coordination, and
systemic resiliency within and across public health systems;
Augments policy and practice innovation and fosters flexibility
and adaptability;
Promotes government accountability and transparency; and
Advances the development and promulgation of legal norms,
resulting in policy harmonization and consistency conducive to
improving public health.

Though these attributes of redundancy exist inherently, they are more
likely to lead to beneficial outcomes through deliberate efforts to achieve
complementarity across and within redundant systems and institutions.
Additional research will be necessary to understand and adapt these systems
to maximize their beneficial characteristics for good governance."
This article articulates a positive view of redundancy and develops a
detailed analysis of the potential benefits of systemic overlap, grounded in
the idea of complementarity in public health law. Part II describes and
challenges the prevailing negative assumptions about redundancy. Part III
examines overlapping systems in public health law, noting how
complementary laws have improved the effectiveness of public health
governance in addressing infectious disease, non-communicable disease, and
emergency preparedness. Part IV establishes the role of complementarity in
public health governance, delineating its benefits as a basis for future
research to assess the tradeoffs between redundancy and complementarity in
public health.
Based upon this initial assessment, Part V urges
reconsideration of the reflexive assumptions against redundancy and further
research into when complementary systems improve public health
governance.
II. THE BASELINE PRESUMPTION AGAINST REDUNDANCY

Since the rise of the U.S. administrative state over the last several decades,
government reformers and legal scholars have engaged in a rich debate over
how to achieve effective and efficient public policy through varied models of
governance. 12 Traditional governance models-typified by rigid hierarchy,
11. See generally Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REv. 1155
(2007).
12. Scott Burris et al., Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current
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centralized systems, and government control 3 -have increasingly been
supplanted or supplemented by more diverse governance systems in many
arenas." The resulting variations, often referred to as "New Governance"
models, seek greater participation from non-governmental actors to render
governance more adaptive, participatory, and flexible. Further challenging
traditional governance models, some legal and policy researchers articulate
devolved governance models-non-hierarchical, multi-participant endeavors
that operate through multiple, uncoordinated nodes'6 that nevertheless
comprise a complex, adaptive system.' 7 These models of governance are not
exclusive; rather they are inextricably linked and operate simultaneously and
concurrently.' The concept of complementarity builds on these New
Governance and devolved governance models to articulate an expansive and
flexible view of governance across overlapping or duplicative infrastructure.
A related discussion over the challenges of regulation in a federalist
system highlights the ambiguities and inconsistencies that exist between
federal and state regulatory powers.' 9 Much of this literature has focused on
Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REv. 1, 44-64 (2008).
13. Christopher K. Leman, Direct Government, in TE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE
TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 48, 49-53 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002). However, some scholars
have suggested less hierarchical, more adaptive approaches within the rubric of traditional
government actors. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 314-23 (1998) (developing a theory of democratic
experimentalism based on decentralization of government and the development of information
pooling, public/private coordination, and mutual learning).
14. See, e.g., NanD. Hunter, "Public-Private" Health Law: Multiple Directions in Public
Health, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 89, 91 (2007) (describing changes in public health
governance); David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regulation:
Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539, 544-48 (2006)
(outlining new governance approaches in the EU).
15. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance
in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342, 344 (2004) (describing and analyzing
New Governance approaches in the United States); Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance
and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO
THE NEW GOVERNANCE 1, 1-14 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002) (defining the New Governance
paradigm).
16. Scott Burris et al., Nodal Governance, 30 AUSTRIAN J. LEGAL PHIL. 30 (2005); see
also Gunther Teubner, Introduction to Autopoietic Law, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW
APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY 1, 1 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987) (describing a model of
reflexive law that accounts for other social institutions); David P. Fidler, A Theory of OpenSource Anarchy, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 259, 282 (2008).
17. R. Chad Swanson et al., Rethinking Health Systems Strengthening: Key Systems
Thinking Tools and Strategies for Transformational Change, 27 HEALTH POL'Y & PLAN. 54
(2012).
18. Lance A. Gable, Evading Emergency: Strengthening Emergency Responses Through
Integrated Pluralistic Governance, 91 OR. L. REv. 375 (2012).
19. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REv. 863 (2006);
William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: ATheory of Regulatory Gaps, 89
IOWAL. REv. 1 (2003); Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. &MARYL. REv. 1549,
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the task of appropriately implementing regulatory oversight by governments
to address multi-jurisdictional problems such as environmental
contamination, climate change, and communicable disease control. 20 These
evolving theories of regulation provide insight into the evolution of
regulatory governance in the U.S., including public health governance.21
Attacks on redundancy pervade these debates, arising indirectly in the guise
of concerns about efficiency, overlapping regulatory jurisdiction, and
coexisting legal obligations.2 2 Traditional examinations of public
administration have been skeptical of redundancy in system design and
institutional structure, suggesting the elimination or minimization of
redundancies. 23
Critics argue that redundant systems or legal requirements prevent clear,
efficient, and streamlined outcomes. 24 According to this view, governance
should use the fewest resources or apply the least regulation of an activity to
achieve a stated goal. 25 In a society increasingly reliant upon logistical
tautness and skyrocketing productivity, redundancy has become anathema.
The impetus to do more with less animates not only private sector attempts
to wring efficiencies from their workforce and production processes, but also
government agencies facing budget shortfalls. This is noted in the context of
overlap in federal regulations:
Longstanding conventional wisdom holds that regulatory overlap entails
waste and therefore should be eliminated whenever found. A standard
prescription in efforts toward regulatory reform, for example, is to rid the
government of duplicative agency programs. Criticisms of regulatory

1567 (2012); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L.
REv. 243 (2005).

20. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1796 (2008);
Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 130 (2005); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REv.
570 (1996); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: APublic Choice
Analysis, 115 HARv. L. REv. 553 (2001).
21. See Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance
in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REv. 503 (2007) (examining federalism issues
arising during the response to Hurricane Katrina).
22. Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REv. 181, 183-84 (2011).
23. See Martin Landau, Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and
Overlap, 29 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 346, 348 (1969) (noting that even skeptics of administrative
dogmas have continued to dogmatically advocate for the elimination of redundancy, citing to
Francis W. Coker, Dogmas of Administrative Reform, 16 AM. POL.SCi. REv. 399 (1922)).
24. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of
Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L. J. 757 (2003); Marisam, supra
note 22.
25. See Landau, supra note 23, at 346-47 (criticizing this prevailingview of redundancy).
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overlap can be classified into four main categories: duplication, conflict,
coordination, and complexity.26
The broad political push toward deregulation across many economic sectors 27
reflects a similar antipathy toward redundant legal oversight that may meddle
with economic factors or interfere with market-driven efficiency.2 8
While criticisms of redundancy are myriad, two key issues related to
regulatory misallocation recur in critical treatments of overlapping or
duplicative laws or systems of governance:
Overregulation. One critique of redundancy arises from the concern that
wasteful overregulation places inappropriately high burdens of cost and
compliance on regulated entities. 29 Critics of redundancy express concern
that duplicative legal regulations coupled with confusion and uncertainty
about applicable laws and enforcement can render compliance overly
difficult.3 0 A related issue may be increased costs of enforcement and
implementation for regulatory agencies-and by extension the general
public-with little additional results to justify these extra costs. 3 1 Regulatory
misallocation also may yield opportunity costs, as agencies or regulated
parties fail to engage in productive activities due to rigorous demands or
conflicts caused by redundant regulatory infrastructures.3 2
Underregulation. Conversely, redundant institutions may result in
underregulation. Under such a "regulatory commons problem," regulatory
agencies evade responsibility by assuming that other agencies with
overlapping jurisdiction will address a specific mandate.33 Thus, redundancy
26. Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and Statutory
Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 286 (2011) (citations omitted).
27. At the direction of President Obama, the United States has embarked on a thorough
review of federal agency regulations to eliminate duplication, redundancy, and inconsistency.
See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 13563 (2011); Cass Sunstein, Cumulative Effects of
Regulations, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS (March 20, 2012), available

at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
assets/inforeg/cumulative-effects-guidance.pdf.
28. Whether these assertions are supported by factual evidence is debatable, yet they
motivate the prevailing wisdom about redundancy and regulation. See Rowan Miranda &
Allan Lerner, Bureaucracy, Organizational Redundancy, and the Privatization of Public
Services, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 193, 193 (1995) (finding that service delivery arrangements
that combine government and private sector or nonprofit entities may be more cost effective
than services delivered by the private sector alone).
29. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space,
125 HARv. L. REV. 1133, 1138 (2012) (citing Teresa M. Schwartz, Protecting Consumer
Health and Safety: The Need for Coordinated Regulation Among Federal Agencies, 43 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1031, 1032 (1975)).
30. Marisam, supra note 22.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
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can lead to collective action problems where multiple participants reduce
their effort, or zero out funding, expecting another entity to perform the
necessary task.34 In underregulating regulated entities, while some systems
(e.g., courts) can successfully utilize redundant structures to correct errors
and hold institutional actors accountable for mistakes through the subsequent
review ofjudicial ruling through appeal and remand processes,35 redundancy
in other systems may allow for savvy entities to avoid regulation as
regulatory agencies disclaim responsibility for governance failures or accede
to industry demands due to collective action problems.36
Despite these concerns, some researchers and policymakers argue in favor
of redundant systems. Consistent with their orientation toward less
centralization and reduced government control, the New Governance and
devolved governance models take a more accepting position on redundancy.
This view implicitly incorporates redundancy into various theories
articulating the potential governance benefits of polycentric regulatory
structures, 37 pluralistic legal regimes with overlapping authority,38 and
widespread participation of multiple parties within and outside government.39
Legal and policy scholars have come to challenge the prevailing negative
view of redundancy and highlighted its potentially positive impacts.40 In his
classic article, Martin Landau criticized the notion that redundancy connotes
"whenever there is an excess or superfluity of anything" as unnecessarily
negative. 4 ' Landau argued that institutions with redundant structures have
108, 121-26 (2005); Marisam, supra note 22.
34. Michael M. Ting, AStrategic Theoryof Bureaucratic Redundancy, 47 Am. J.POL. SCI.
274, 275 (2003) (using game theory to examine the potential benefits and drawbacks of
strategic redundancy).
35. Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 642 (1981).
36. Marisam, supra note 22.
37. Julia Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in
Polycentric Regulatory Regimes, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 137, 140 (2008) (identifying five
central notions of decentered regulation: complexity, fragmentation, interdependencies,
ungovernability, and rejection of a clear public/private distinction); Jody Freeman,
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4-7 (1997);
Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87
CALIF. L. REV. 1409, 1411 (1999).
38. Berman, supra note 11; Christine Parker, The Pluralization of Regulation, 9
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 349, 352-55 (2008) (examining the normative argument for legal
pluralism in regulation); Brian Z. Tamanaha, ANon-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism,
27 J.L. & Soc'Y 296, 312-20 (2000) (outlining a non-essentialist theory of legal pluralism).
39. See Burris et al., supra note 16, at 4-6 (articulating a theory of nodal governance). But
see Fidler, supra note 16, at 282 (arguing that a multiplicity of nodes will have anarchic effects
on governance).
40. For a more detailed discussion of the positive aspects of redundancy, see infra Section
IV.
41. Landau, supra note 23, at 346.
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greater reliability and adaptability. 2 Additionally, he suggested that the
Framers intentionally designed the U.S. government to contain multiple legal
and institutional redundancies.4 3 Robert Cover similarly challenged the
negative views regarding redundancy. In a provocative reassessment of
jurisdictional and institutional redundancy, Cover proposed that "instead of
viewing the persistence of concurrency as a dysfunctional relic, one may
hypothesize that it is a product of institutional evolution."
In Cover's seminal essay on jurisdictional redundancy, he situated
redundancy within the federalist jurisdictional structure of the American
court system. Cover defined redundancy as "complex concurrency,"
comprised of three attributes: "strategic choice, synchronic redundancy, and
diachronic or sequential redundancy." 5 Strategic choice (i.e., forum
shopping) allows litigants to choose courts likely to be more favorable in
deciding their case. 6 Synchronic redundancy permits multiple similar cases
to be brought simultaneously in different jurisdictions. Diachronic or
sequential redundancy authorizes other jurisdictions to resolve some aspects
of a case started elsewhere though appeal or remand." Cover identified four
potential benefits of jurisdictional redundancy: (1) reduction of error; (2)
minimization of conflict and self-interest; (3) dissipation of strong
ideological positioning; and (4) encouragement of innovation. 4 9
Landau and Cover's insights on the positive potential of redundancy as a
tool of governance and policy inspired others to consider the potential
usefulness of redundancy in regulation and development of legal norms and
structures.o As discussed below, redundancy permeates public health
42. Id. at 348.
43. Martin Landau, Federalism, Redundancy and System Reliability, 3 PUBLIUS 173, 187188 (1973) (noting that redundancy in the United States system, exemplified by federalism
and checks and balances across governmental branches, was address first in Federalist No. 10
to seek stability and reliability in the face of "instability, injustice, and confusion").
44. Cover, supra note 35, at 642.
45. Id. at 646.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 647-48.
48. Id. at 648-49.
49. Id. at 650.
50. See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1044-46 (1977); see also Ahdieh, supra note 19,
at 866; Paul Schiff Berman, Federalism and International Law Through the Lens of Legal
Pluralism, 73 Mo. L. REV. 1151 (2008); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism As A Safeguard
of the Separation of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 479, 506 (2012); Allan Erbsen,
Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 500 (2008); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the
Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006); Johanna
Kalb, Dynamic Federalism in Human Rights Treaty Implementation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1025,
1055 (2010). For a more detailed discussion of applications of positive theories of redundancy
and complementarity to public health governance, see infra Section IV.
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systems and public health law, as does the default negative view of
redundancy. As public health governance faces increasing complexity, this
negative conception of redundancy should give way to a more nuanced
understanding of its effects on public health that balances both positive and
negative aspects of overlapping and duplicative systems.
III. REDUNDANCY IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND PUBLIC HEALTH LAW

Consistent with negative notions of redundancy, practitioners of public
health law have sought to reduce redundant systems in public health
governance. Public health governance has evolved through incremental
reforms, resulting in pluralistic and uncoordinated systems. Although these
developments were not pursued as a means to develop concurrent or
duplicative systems, the current model is a fragmented system composed of
overlapping institutions and legal authorities." As part of a larger critique of
public health law and an effort to improve public health governance, scholars
have focused, inter alia, on the harms of redundant institutions in public
health.
Given a presumption against redundant systems in public health
govemance-both within states and between state and federal authoritiespublic health practitioners have long pursued legal reform as a basis for
streamlining public health systems. 5 2 The past decade has seen intense
interest in "modernization" of state public health laws, which are the
structural basis for public health practice and programs in the United States.
These domestic criticisms of redundancy have been replicated at the
international level, where researchers and practitioners have sought a basis to
reduce overlapping systems and promote "efficiency" in global health
governance.5 3 Despite these criticisms of redundant laws and efforts to reduce
redundancy in public health, overlapping systems-in infectious disease
control, non-communicable
disease
reduction,
and emergency
preparedness-highlight how complementary systems can prove effective in
meeting public health goals.
A Infectious Disease Control
As the U.S. federalist system devolves public health authority to the state
51. GoSTIN, supra note 1.
52. Benjamin Mason Meier, James G. Hodge, Jr. & Kristine M. Gebbie, Transitions in
State Public Health Law: Comparative Analysis of State Public Health Law Reform Efforts
Following the Turning Point Model State Public Health Act, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 423
(2009).
53. David P. Fidler, Architecture Amidst Anarchy: Global Health's Quest for
Governance,
1
GLOBAL
HEALTH
GOVERNANCE
(2007),
available
at
http://ghgj.org/Fidler Architecture.pdf.
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level, states have pursued varied models of public health law. This diversity
is seen as particularly disadvantageous in infectious disease control,
operating under the adage that "diseases know no borders" and drawing upon
a 600-year global tradition of harmonizing infectious disease regulations to
coordinate the actions of multiple jurisdictions for mutual benefit." In the
American public health tradition, each state's health codes have evolved
independently, resulting in profound variations in the structure and substance
of infectious disease control. State borders, however, are artificial in the
context of disease, and jurisdictional boundaries prove an impediment to
achieving a coordinated response to widespread threats." Where varied laws
have been amended over the years to respond to specific health threats,
piecemeal state legislation creates disparate infectious disease control
systems in which public health officials are accorded different levels of
authority according to varying criteria that change with the type of disease.
Recognizing redundant authorities as a weakness of public health law in
responding to contemporary health threats," public health practitioners have
worked over the past decade to "modernize" state public health authorities to
reflect a nationwide model of public health governance and centralized
hierarchies for infectious disease control.
These efforts to achieve public health law reform have facilitated
harmonization as a basis to structure complementarities in infectious disease
control. Researchers and practitioners have worked to develop "model acts"
to create concurrent public health authorities for each state public health
system. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services report, Healthy
People 2010, viewed statutory revision as a key tool to harmonizing state
public health systems. 59 Likewise, the 2003 Turning Point Model State Public
Health Act provided a comprehensive template for states, tribes, and local
governments interested in public health law reform.60 As a basis for
normative convergence, public health model acts provide a template to spur
54. DAVID P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INFECTIOUS DISEASE 20-39 (1999).
55. See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin, Scott Burris & Zita Lazzarini, The Law and the
Public 's Health: A Study of Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
59 (1999).
56. LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 13, 317-19
(2000).
57. INST. OF MED., TE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH IN THE 21sT CENTURY (2002),
available at http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%/ 2OFiles/2002/The-Future-of-thePublics-Health-in-the-2 1st-Century/Future%20ofo2OPublics%2OHealtho202002%20
Report%20Briefpdf.
58. Hunter, supra note 14, at 91.
59. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Healthy People 2010 Final Review, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
AND
PREVENTION
(2011),
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hpdata2010/hp2010 final review.pdf.
60. Hodge, Gostin, Gebbie & Erickson, supra note 7, at 77.
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independent state legal reforms based upon a universal set of policy goals for
infectious disease control." While the specific legislative language and legal
authorities of these reforms will differ by state context and political
constraints, the outcome of these divergent bills meet the same, uniform
public health goals. 62 Harmonizing public health law across jurisdictions,
these model acts stimulate public health law reform within states, 63
performance improvements among health departments, 4 and complementary
systems for infectious disease control.
B. Non-Communicable Disease Reduction
In the context of non-communicable disease control, redundant laws and
policies are criticized for limiting the centralized control thought necessary
to respond to non-communicable disease. As local public health entities
pursue independent public health responses, this "microgovernance" is
faulted for jurisdiction-specific funding and authorities that lead to
"duplicative, incomplete, and counterproductive interventions. "65 With these
efforts presumed to be wastefully inefficient-both for regulatory agencies
and regulated businesses-federal policy makers have pursued more "costeffective" national responses to non-communicable disease threats.66
Yet despite these drawbacks, overlapping systems provide resilience,
adaptability, and innovation in the public health response to noncommunicable disease. Across jurisdictions, complementary systems allow
innovative responses to non-communicable disease. Local policymakers
serve as "norm entrepreneurs" in changing unhealthy behaviors.6 ' Examples
such as local tobacco control efforts across communities-which shifted the
tide of tobacco use in America-and recent efforts to limit unhealthy food
61.

Kenneth DeVille, The Turning Point Model State Public Health Act and Responsible

Public Health Advocacy, 15

J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. & PRAC.

281 (2009).

62. Meier, Hodge & Gebbie, supra note 52.
63. Hodge, Gostin, Gebbie & Erickson, supra note 7; Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The
Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Planning for and Response to Bioterrorism and
Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases, 288 JAMA 622 (2002).
64. Jacqueline Merrill et al., Examination of the Relationship Between Public Health
Statute Modernization and Local Public Health System Performance, 15 J. PUB. HEALTH
MGMT. & PRAc. 292 (2009).
65. Scott Burris, Governance, Microgovernance and Health, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 225, 355
(2004).

66. Megan Danko, Protecting Our Food: A Critical Look at the National Uniformity for
Food Act of 2004 and Food Safety in America, 17 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 253 (2005); see
also Kumanan Wilson et al., Establishing Public Health Security in A Postwar Iraq:
Constitutional Obstacles and Lessons for Other Federalizing States, 34 J.HEALTH POL. POL'Y
& L. 381 (2009).
67. William H. Dietz, Donald E. Benken & Alicia S. Hunter, Public Health Law and the
Prevention and Control of Obesity, 87 MILBANK Q. 215 (2009).
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consumption (seen in sodium and "transfat" consumption, school lunch
options, and soda serving sizes) have proven effective locally in managing
public health. This effort is aided by rapid uptake of policy reforms into local
law and derailing of obstacles to regulation at the local level." Such
duplicative delegations across agencies further a multi-sectoral approach to
"health in all policies," 69 creating synergy across regulating agencies and
allowing for recognition of the extent to which underlying determinants of
non-communicable disease require a whole-of-government response.70
Further, with concurrent governance stretching beyond the public sector,
corporate actors have become policymakers in overlapping systems for noncommunicable disease control." This result is highlighted by a proliferating
set of business practices restricting tobacco use among employees and
creating workplace wellness programs. These flexible partnerships across
government and non-government actors have proven effective where
centralized hierarchies (at both the national and international level) have been
incommensurate to the growing threat of non-communicable disease.
C. Emergency Preparedness
Critics view redundancy in emergency preparedness as leading to
operational confusion and conflicting mandates that result in breakdowns
during crises. 72 This operational confusion presents itself both across and
within states.73 Notwithstanding efforts to harmonize state emergency
preparedness laws through model acts, there is comparatively less
understanding of how states will approach a cross-jurisdictional public health

68. Michelle M. Mello, David M. Studdert, & Troyen A. Brennan, Obesity The New
Frontier of Public Health Law, 354 NEWENG. J.MED. 2601 (2006) (Because of the advantages
of localized governance in non-communicable disease control, researchers and practitioners
have come to see coordination as a threat to innovation, with a growing public health
movement opposing industry-sponsored efforts to limit local governance through
"preemption" by state law.); Scott Burris et al., Moving from Intersection to Integration:
Public Health Law Research and Public Health Systems and Services Research, 90 MLBANK
Q. 375 (2012).
69.

TIMo STAHL ET AL., HEALTH IN ALL POLICIES: PROSPECTS AND POTENTIALS (2006),

available at http://www.euro.who.int/ data/assets/pdf file/0003/109146/E89260.pdf.
70. Steven H. Woolf & Paula Braveman, Where Health Disparities Begin: The Role of
Social And Economic Determinants-And Why Current Policies May Make Matters Worse,
30 HEALTH AFF. 1852 (2011).

71. Hunter, supra note 14, at 105.
72. Robert M. Pestronk et al., Improving Laws and Legal Authorities for Public Health
Emergency Legal Preparedness, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 47 (2008).
73. Dorothy Puzio, An Overview of Public Health in the New Millenium: Individual
Liberty vs. Public Safety, 18 J.L. & HEALTH 173, 179 (2004).
74. James G. Hodge, Jr., The Evolution of Law in Biopreparedness, 10 BIOSECURITY &
BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 38 (2012).

Vol 22, 2013

Annals of Health Law

236

COMPLEMENTARITY IN PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEMS

disaster,'7 in part because the federal government is reluctant to assume
national authority in the context of emergencies. 76 Within states, there are
often conflicting agency responsibilities-triggered in part by varying levels
of emergency, disaster, and public health emergency declarations-that may
create complications among regulatory agencies (and with non-agency
actors) during emergency response efforts.
Given this confusion
engendered by redundant institutions, the federal government has sought to
unify emergency preparedness authorities through incentives for coordinated
response protocols, financial support, and voluminous guidance. 7 8 During the
Hurricane Katrina response, for example, better coordination among systems
and the availability of alternative mechanisms of governance to effectuate
rapid response could have circumvented the gridlocked bureaucracy and
operational failures that occurred. 79 Yet even in emergency response
situations, where efficient responses are paramount, complementary systems
can play a positive role in effectuating good public health outcomesprovided these overlapping authorities have coordinated, or at least wellaligned features."o Under complementary emergency preparedness systems,
there is a mechanism for effective governance even upon the failure of one
or more concurrent systems and an opportunity to enhance the capacity and
effectiveness of response efforts."
IV. SHIFTING THE BASELINE: MOVING FROM REDUNDANCY TO
COMPLEMENTARITY

Overlapping or duplicative public health systems have both negative and
positive attributes of redundancy that impact their ability to influence public
health governance. Whereas the negative attributes of redundancy produce
primarily negative public health outcomes or negative externalities that
overshadow potential benefits, positive overlap in the form of
complementarity produces a beneficial outcome or meets a desired policy
goal without undermining those benefits through negative consequences.
75. Corey P. Hanrahan & Bryan A. Liang, Promoting Public Health and Provider
Response to Emergencies and Disasters, 11 U. PA. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 29 (2008).
76. David L. Feinberg, Hurricane Katrina and the Public Health-Based Argument for
Greater Federal Involvement in Disaster Preparedness and Response, 13 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y
& L. 596 (2006).
77. James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., The Legal Framework for Meeting Surge Capacity Through
the Use of Volunteer Health Professionals During Public Health Emergencies and Other
Disasters, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 5 (2005).

78. Benjamin E. Berkman, Susan C. Kim & Lindsay F. Wiley, Assessing the Impact of
Federal Law on Public Health Preparedness, 4 ST. LouIs U.J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 155 (2010).
79. Id. at 401-09.
80. Gable, supra note 18, at 445-53.
81. Id.
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Thus, whether overlap or duplication is considered negative or positive is
contextual and hinges on specific circumstances in the development and
implementation of public health law. Public health governance has an
opportunity to minimize the negative attributes of redundancy while
advancing the beneficial attributes of complementarity, in effect moving
from a model of regulatory efficiency to one of regulatory effectiveness. An
examination of complementary public health legal authorities highlights how
policymakers can address public health goals incrementally through
autonomous and overlapping actors.
Building from the governance and regulatory literature (drawing on
foundational theories on the beneficial aspects of overlapping institutions by
Landau and Cover)8 2 and looking to the experience of public health
governance-as seen in the cases of infectious disease control, noncommunicable disease reduction, and emergency preparedness-several
possible benefits of public health complementarity emerge, including: (1)
expansion of capacity and systemic resiliency; (2) innovation in policy and
practice; (3) promotion of accountability and transparency; and (4)
development of normative and procedural harmonization and consistency.83
A Expansion of Capacity and Systemic Resiliency
The existence of multiple institutions and governance pathways connected
to public health can expand the capacity of public health systems to address
population health concerns and allow these systems to continue to function
under unexpected challenges. More institutions means more opportunities for
advancement of public health. As seen in the "health in all policies" approach
to health promotion, health disparities cannot be mitigated through the
health sector alone. Multisectoral approaches to social determinants of health
are essential." Under these circumstances, complementarity results both (1)
where multisectoral strategies to promote health have been adopted through
coordinated collaborative planning and (2) where disparate uncoordinated
actors have adopted common goals.
Complementarity can enhance the ability of public health practitioners and
advocates to successfully take action to protect public health and allow
institutional actors to more effectively target resources. For example, law can
authorize or mandate the expansion of sources of information that contribute
82. See discussion of Landau and Cover, supra Section II.
83. This discussion does not claim to identify all of the potential benefits of
complementarity or cite to all relevant examples within public health law and governance, but
instead to provide an initial assessment of these potential benefits as a basis for further
development.
84. See discussion of health in all policies in supra Section III.B.
85. STAHL ET AL., supra note 69.
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surveillance data for public health threats through data sharing or expanding
surveillance sources required to report data to public health officials. The
revised International Health Regulations," syndromic surveillance
programs," and state HIV and sexually transmitted infection reporting
statutes" use this approach to gain the aggregative benefits of multiple,
overlapping information sources to more accurately track infectious disease
outbreaks.89
Complementary governance may help protect against governance failures
and correct mistakes. Systems with multiple, concurrent institutions can
achieve integrated pluralistic governance, allowing for continued
functionality even when some aspects of the system fail to operate
effectively.90 This type of systemic resiliency is vital whether the challenge
arises from specific institutions or entire systems losing capacity to provide
public health services due to dwindling resources, incapacitation from a
catastrophic event, or necessary corrections of previous failings. 9' For
example, systemic failures of the public health system during Hurricane
Katrina could have been mitigated with greater complementarity in response
planning and capacity,9 2 and subsequent efforts to redesign the emergency
86. WORLD HEALTH ORG., INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2nd ed. 2005),
available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241580410_eng.pdf (see Article
11.1 allowing collection of data from both government and third-party sources); see also
David P. Fidler & Lawrence 0. Gostin, The New International Health Regulations: An
Historic Development for International Law and Public Health, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 90
(2006).
87. Jean-Paul Chretien et al., Syndromic Surveillance: Adapting Innovations to
Developing Settings, 5 PLoS MEDicine 367-372 (2008); see also Larissa May, Jean-Paul
Chretien & Julie A. Pavlin, Beyond Traditional Surveillance: Applying Syndromic
Surveillance to Developing Settings - Opportunities and Challenges, 9 BMC PUB. HEALTH
242 (2009) (describing examples of syndromic surveillance used to detect sexually transmitted
infections (STIs) and other public health concerns). But see David P. Fidler, Return of the
Fourth Horseman: Emerging Infectious Diseases and International Law, 81 MINN. L. REv.
771 (1997) (offering a critical exanination of surveillance strategies and outcomes).
88. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121022(a) (West 2012)(requiring both health care
providers and laboratories to report HIV infection cases by name to the local health officer,
who is further required to report such cases to the California Department of Public Health);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §25-4-1405.5(2)(a)(I) (West 2013) (requiring both health care
providers and laboratories to report diagnosed cases ofHIV infection to the state or local health
department).
89. This strategy for epidemic surveillance is also being used by social media and search
engine programmers to track outbreaks in real time. See e.g., Explore Flu Trends Around the
World, GOOGLE.ORG FLU TRENDS, http://www.google.org/flutrends/ (last visited Mar. 29,
2013).
90. Gable, supra note 18, at 434-36.
91. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 29, at 1139 (citing Mathew D. McCubbins &
Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms,
28 Am. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984)).
92. Gable, supra note 18, at 436-45.

Vol 22, 2013

Annals of Health Law

239

COMPLEMENTARITY IN PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEMS

response system have considered models consistent with integrated
pluralistic governance and complementarity. 93
These features of complementarity provide a safety net to assure
protection of the public's health. Given the highly unpredictable nature of
public health threats, the existence of safeguards through complementary
institutions can be significantly beneficial in gap-filling functions, enhanced
response to social needs through pooled resources, and prevention of
overinfluence by interest groups. 94 These potential advantages of
complementarity belie the usual concerns about redundancy focused on
inefficiency, cost, and lack of coordination. While overlapping or duplicative
multi-sectoral and multi-participant efforts to improve health can be
undermined by excessive fragmentation and collective action problems or by
misallocation of resources, 95 even staunch critics of redundancy concede the
need for systemic resilience during circumstances that pose a "risk of
catastrophic and irreversible harms."96 Moreover, such concerns about
fragmentation and inefficiency may be alleviated with efforts to engage in
strategic coordination and establish a systemic architecture designed to
minimize those harmful effects and maximize complementary roles.
B. Innovation in Policy and Practice
Complementarity across overlapping public health laws and systems also
can spur innovation in policy and practice through the introduction of
flexibility and adaptability in policy development and in practical
implementation of public health strategies. A legal system hidebound by
hierarchy or rigidly, and limited by aggressive anti-regulatory interpretations
of preemption doctrine, may not be able to engage in robust public health
protection. By contrast, systems that exhibit complementarity and feature
Cover's categories of synchronic or sequential redundancy create
opportunities to protect public health through legal and policy

93.

Id. at 444-45; see also U.S.

DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., NATIONAL HEALTH

UNITED
STATES
OF
AMERICA
5-17 (2009),
http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/authority/nhss/strategy/Documents/nhssfinal.pdf; BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE 8: NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS
(Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness;
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BIENNIAL IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR THE
NATIONAL HEALTH SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 12-53 (2010),
http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/authority/nhss/comments/Documents/nhssbipdraft-100719.pdf.
94. Engel, supra note 50, at 178-79.
95. Fidler, supra note 53 (expressing concern that multiple participants in global health
governance will undermine rather than augment capacity).
96. See Marisam, supra note 22, at 224 (referring to CASS R. SUNSTEN, WORST-CASE
SCENARIOS (2007)).
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experimentation, adaptation to changing circumstances, and the ability to
overcome bureaucratic obstacles through innovative uses of policy and
procedure.97 Synchronic redundancy recognizes that duplicative institutions,
such as concurrent state public health agencies or court systems, can allow
for simultaneous efforts to advance public health or other policy goals.98
Impact litigation designed to hold industries that threaten public health
accountable and spur legislative action often benefits from synchronic
redundancy. Sequential redundancy pertains to overlapping authority that
permits other institutions or actors to overturn, modify, or correct previous
determinations or failures by others.99 Thus, governance models that
incorporate ideas of dynamic federalism' 00 or a preference for "floor"
preemption over complete preemption of state and local regulations by
federal regulations' 0' foster flexibility and adaptability consistent through
complementarity. Permitting state and local governments to impose more
stringent regulations than federal minimums to protect public health would
employ sequential redundancy in a complementary way. By contrast, federal
laws that preempt further state and local efforts to protect public health-as

97. Cover, supra note 35, at 647-49.
98. Notably, sequential redundancy also supports expanded capacity and systemic
resiliency as described in supra Section IV. A.
99. Cover, supra note 35, at 648-49.
100. Ruhl and Salzman articulate the following benefits of redundancy in Dynamic
Federalism:
[W]hile it may appear inefficient to have several agencies whittling away at the
same externality, the built-in redundancy of Dynamic Federalism can provide
significant benefits. It gives the overall system of governance more space to track
the evolving scales of externalities. It allows governance adaptation to transpire
more quickly and with less political jockeying than static, exclusive jurisdiction
models such as the matching principle, under which neat divisions of authority
would have to be constantly redrawn. Having multiple agencies working within
overlapping scales can also promote synergy between the agencies. Finally, the
ability to adjust which agencies are involved allows greater flexibility to craft
place-based coalitions of agencies responsive to the shifting and discontinuous
spatial and temporal scales of the externalities-a flexibility that makes it possible
to pass around the proverbial football as a complex cumulative effects problem
changes form over time.
J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the
Administrative State: AGuide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 104-05 (2010) (citing
David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism The Case Against Reallocating
Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1799-1800, 1808-10, 1817-18
(2008); Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law,
2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 214 (2006); Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds:
Environmental Federalism and the Need for Federal Action on Renewable Energy and
Climate Change, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 408, 448-51 (2008); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward
a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IowAL. REV. 243, 292-93 (2005)).
101. Buzbee, supra note 10.
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seen in restrictions on local regulations for tobacco,10 2 firearms,1 03 and
product liability litigation' 04 -undermine sequential redundancy.
Policy innovation can flourish across complementary systems. Cover cited
the ability of courts in different circuits to formulate different interpretations
of a regulation as a key to promoting innovation and overcoming
ideologically-driven policy making through redundancy. In the context of
public health law and governance, policy-making diversity across
jurisdictions has advanced public health practice. In the context of noncommunicable disease control, redundancy has served as a basis for legal
experimentation; distinctions among dynamic local jurisdictions highlight
effective systems for health promotion.' Flexible and adaptable systems
provide more varied and robust opportunities for achieving outcomes
otherwise constrained by a less diverse and dynamic system. An analogous
potential benefit of added flexibility in public health governance could be the
ability of agency decision-makers or public health advocates to evade barriers
and bureaucratic bottlenecks, or to more quickly adapt to new public health
challenges. Landau noted that duplication within governance allows for the
detection and correction of errors within the system, while overlap "endows
such systems with a very high degree of adaptability, of flexible and
appropriately responsive changes to external stimuli."106
Such complementarity may promote beneficial competition between
institutions, which can serve to improve both effectiveness and efficiency. 0 7
Facilitating effectiveness, Ruhl and Salzman further observe that diverse
governance instruments are more effective in the hands of a manageable
number of overlapping agencies as compared with a single agency or
multiple agencies that do not overlap. With multiple overlapping agencies, it
is possible to discover which instruments are most effective at handling the
"particular externalities of a cumulative effects problem" and "passing
instruments around as the cumulative effects problem evolves and its
102. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340
(2013).
103. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (2005), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7903
(2013) (protecting firearms sellers and manufacturers from civil lawsuits seeking "damages,
injunctive, or other relief resulting from the misuse of their products by others").
104. Riegel v. Medtronic Inc., 128 S.Ct. 999 (2008) (preempting state law tort claim that
medical device label approved by the FDA was defective).
105. Mark Pertschuk et al., Assessing the Impact of Federal and State Preemption in
Public Health: AFramework for Decision Makers, J.PUB. HEALTH MGMT & PRAC. (2012).
106. Landau, supra note 43, at 189.
107. Gersen, supra note 100. But see Maria Ivanova & Jennifer Roy, The Architecture of
Global Environmental Governance: Pros and Cons of Multiplicity, in GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE CURRENT DEBATE 48, 51-53 (Lydia
Swart & Estelle Perry eds., Center for UN Reform Education 2007) (questioning the
effectiveness of competition among participants in governance).
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externalities change in form, intensity, and scale."' These mechanisms,
while complex, could provide a means to achieve more complementary
public health governance as agencies and other interested parties coordinate
and interact to share ideas and solve health problems.
Finally, jurisdictional redundancy in the courts allows for strategic choice
in public health impact litigation. Public health advocates have had a mixed
record of success using the courts to advance health. While courts have
traditionally given great deference to public health powers,109 and have
served as a venue for successful challenges to corporate practices that
imperiled health and safety," 0 industry challenges to overturn public health
regulations increasingly limit the governments' ability to protect public
health."' Nevertheless, public health advocates and government actors will
continue to use the concurrent structures of the judiciary to promote public
health.
C. Promoting Accountability and Transparency
Complementarity within public health laws and systems can promote
accountability and transparency across participants in public health
governance. This facet of overlapping systems fosters the correction of errors
through sequential redundancy.11 2 Sequential redundancy in the form of
federalism and judicial review provides robust opportunities for
accountability and allows mistakes to be corrected through redundant
mechanisms." 3 As a result, legal precedents and reform initiatives that limit
judicial oversight or preempt state and local activity, as has occurred in
relation to tobacco and firearms, may reduce accountability.

108. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 100, at 106-07.
109. See, e.g., Jacobsonv. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905) (upholding state police
powers to compulsorily vaccinate for smallpox).
110. Williamsonv. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1134 (2011) (holding that
lawsuits are not pre-empted when manufacturers have choice of seatbelt style to install for rear
seats).
111. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 268 (D.D.C. 2012)
(overturning FDA cigarette warning labels as a violation of the First Amendment right of free
speech).
112. Cover, supra note 35, at 647-49.
113. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Forum Choice for Terrorism Suspects, 61 DuKE L.J. 1415,
1461, 1468 (2012) (discussing how appellate courts may exonerate the wrongfully convicted
defendant).
114. See, e.g., Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120, 126 (2000) (finding FDA's jurisdiction to regulate tobacco limited, later overturned by
federal regulations); Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (2005), 15 U.S.C. §§ 79017903 (2013) (protecting firearms sellers and manufacturers from civil lawsuits seeking
"damages, injunctive, or other relief resulting from the misuse of their products by others");
see also, Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States: The Need to Limit Federal Preemption, 33
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Likewise, appropriately structured complementarity can heighten
transparency. Systems with multiple participants have a greater need to share
information to coordinate and collaborate effectively. Similarly, the
expansion of participants in public health governance provides additional
sources of information, which can contribute to the overall transparency of
public health initiatives. For instance, numerous entities track and report
health care-associated infections, including the National Healthcare Safety
Network, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, state health
departments, the Joint Commission, and some individual hospital
themselves." 5 Likewise, expansion of multi-source communicable disease
surveillance allow for disease tracking and well-informed targeting of public
health resources based on more accurate data. 6
This multiplicity of information sources to track infections can create
much greater insight into the scope of the problems than discrete efforts.
Transparency is not a given under this construct but can be achieved through
legal requirements and incentives.
D. Producing Normative and Procedural Harmonization and Consistency
Redundancy across jurisdictional boundaries can promote normative and
procedural consistency in addressing public health through the development
of common approaches to resolving population health problems. Since state
and local public health laws may vary considerably, researchers often express
concern over the harmful health effects of inconsistent legal regimes.
However, as seen in the effective efforts of model laws to harmonize state
public health laws for infectious disease control and emergency preparedness
systems, systemic redundancy in a federalist system can reinforce public
health governance." 8 The international development of Framework
Conventions targeting tobacco control" 9 and global health generally 20 has
solidified the notion that a common legal template can set the basic
PEPP. L. REV. 69 (2005).

115. Benjamin Mason Meier, Patricia Stone & Kristine M. Gebbie, Public Health Law for
the Collection and Reporting of Healthcare-Associated Infections, 36 AM. J. OF INFECTION
CONTROL 537 (2008).
116. See, e.g., Chretien et al., supra note 87; May, Chretien & Pavlin, supra note 87.
117. Wendy E. Parmet, After September 11: Rethinking Public Health Federalism, 30 J.
L. MED. & ETHICS 201 (2002).

118.

Meier, Hodge & Gebbie, supra note 52.

119.

WORLD HEALTH ORG., FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL (2003),

available at http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/WHO FCTCenglish.pdf.
120. Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Joint Action and Learning Initiative: Towards a
Global Agreement on National and Global Responsibilities for Health, 8 PLoS MED.
e1001031 (2011), available at http://www.ncbi.fnlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3091848/pdf/
pmed.1001031.pdf.
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parameters of public health laws and still allow flexibility for local
innovation and norm-setting. With effective communication and evidentiary
support, innovations in public health policy can spread and improve across
jurisdictional boundaries as a direct consequence of complementarity.
Despite efforts to reach the harmonization described above, public health
systems have not routinely achieved normative consistency across
overlapping and duplicative systems. Indeed, the multiplicity of participants
and concurrent legal regimes in public health governance may provoke
tradeoffs between flexibility and consistency, or between innovation and
harmonization. Normative and procedural harmonization can be compatible
with other aspects of complementarity such as innovation, flexibility, and
systemic resilience through the use of collaboration and communication.
Through the employment of dialectical tools, common normative and
procedural approaches to public health governance can be shared and
improved.121 Additionally, with further research, a more extensive typology
of redundancy and complementarity in public health governance can
developed and assessed.
V. CONCLUSION

Since Landau first challenged the presumptions against redundancy over
40 year ago, his observation stands true: "[T]he task remains to learn to
distinguish between inefficient redundancies and those that are constructive
and reinforcing- [including] the kind of knowledge which will permit the
introduction of redundancies so that they can work to increase both reliability

and adaptability."

22

Moving from an examination of regulatory efficiency to one of regulatory
effectiveness, most public health systems will have both redundant and
complementary attributes. Complementarity will likely be advanced through
coordination, communication, systemic-level assessments, pluralistic
methods and participants, and consistent normative defaults, among other
strategies. Mitigating the redundant and fostering the complementary should
be the goal of public health governance. To understand the advantages and
disadvantages of overlapping systems, public health law research will need
to incorporate systems theory into its analysis and recognize law as integral
to complex adaptive public health systems.123
Public health governance highlights the beneficial role of complementary

121.
122.
123.

See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 50; Freeman & Rossi, supra note 29.
Landau, supra note 23, at 356.
R. Chad Swanson et al., Rethinking Health Systems Strengthening: Key Systems

Thinking Tools and Strategies for Transformational Change, 27 HEALTH POL'Y & PLAN. 54

(2012).
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systems in growing capacity and systemic resiliency; increasing innovation
in policy and practice; promoting accountability and transparency; and
supporting normative and procedural harmonization and consistency. While
redundancy poses drawbacks in public health law, the point at which those
drawbacks outweigh benefits of complementarity is unclear. Additional legal
research will be needed to conceptualize this tension between redundancy
and complementarity and categorize types of legal overlap, employing this
typology to study the effects of overlapping systems on the public's health.
Rather than reflexively assuming redundancy to be harmful to public health
governance, research may determine those contexts in which complementary
institutions can prove advantageous. This initial assessment applying theories
of redundancy and complementarity to public health governance suggests
that some overlap is inevitable, but that in many cases, it may bring with it
significant benefits for the public's health.

